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China-US
relations between
trade ties have expanded dramatically since the establishment of diplomatic
the two countries in 1979. During the decade of the 198Os, China-US trade
grew more rapidly than the world trade and China’s total trade. In 1990 China was the United
States’ tenth-largest trading partner, and one of its largest suppliers for textiles, shoes, toys and
games. The United States, in turn, was China’s third-largest trading partner (ranking behind
Hong Kong and Japan) and a major source of the technology and investment needed for Chinese
economic development. It is therefore not surprising that China-US trade has received
considerable attention in the analysis of the Chinese economy (Harding 1987, Hsu 1989, Chen
1991).
The China-US trade relationship is, however, at a crossroad. There are at least two major
trade issues that will impact the growth of China-US trade. First, the past several months have
seen a raging &bate in the United States over the renewal of China’s most-favored-nation (MFN)
status, which allows nondiscriminatory tariff treatment for Chinese exports to the United States,
and Export-Import Bank financing for United States exports to China. Although President Bush
announced he would renew China’s status for another year, strong pressures emerged from some
in the Congress to use MFN to punish China for the Tiananmen incident in 1989. If China were
stripped of MEN status, its exports to the United States would be largely snuffed out by killer
tariffs. Second, in recent years there has been increasing trade imbalance between China and the
United States. This issue is, however, complicated by the problem of discrepancies between
Chinese and United States trade data. Chinese statistics indicate a Chinese deficit of $1.4 billion
in trading with the United States in 1990, whereas United States data show a United States trade
1deficit of $10.4 billion with China (BEER, 30 January 1992). Clearly the growing trade
imbalance has been of great concern to both sides and is likely to become a priority issue in the
future trade agenda.
China-US trade growth over the past decade is of theoretical and policy importance.
During the late 1970s and the early 198Os, there was an intense debate over the role of trade in
the economic development of developing countries. Some economists advocated the superiority
of the export-led strategy in the light of the impressive growth in manufactured exports achieved
by the Asian NICs since the 1960s. They argued that other developing countries should
transform from a high-protection, import-substitution policy to an export-led policy to accelerate
economic growth (Balassa 1980, Little 1982, Krueger 1984). Nevertheless, others were skeptical
about the possibilities for export expansion from developing countries. In their view, recession
in developed countries, followed by a weak recovery, since the late 1970s reduced their demand
for the products of the LDCs and resulted in greater restrictions placed on imports from these
countries. This severely limited developing countries’ access to the markets of developed
countries (Lewis 1980, Diaz-Alejandro 1980, Edwards 1985). While it now seems widely
accepted that outward-oriented trade strategies are superior to inward-oriented strategies, many
economists urge that more country-specific studies over time are needed to provide new evidence
(Helpman 1989, Havrylyshyn 1990).
The objective of this paper is to examine the growth and structural change in China-US
trade in the post-1979 period, analyze the causal factors and policies shaping this ttend, highlight
the position from which the future development of China-US trade will begin, and to review the
basic structure.upon which trade policy of both countries must operate. The paper is organized
2as follows: Sections 2 and 3 examine respectively the aggregate growth and the commodity
composition of China-US trade. Section 4 discusses Hong Kong’s role in China-US trade.
Section 5 analyzes Chinese trade policy. Some conclusions are outlined in the  tinal section.
2. Aggregate Growth
China-US trade growth during the post-1979 period can be best understood against the
broader background of China’s recent participation in the world economy.’ After nearly two
decades of adhering to a relatively autarkic strategy that minimized the nation’s dependence on
the global market, China opened up the economy in the late 1970s. Since then a huge change
has occuffed:  Beijing has place greater emphasis on foreign trade, encouraged foreign investment
in the domestic economy; accepted foreign debts; joined the major international organizations;
and multiplied the channels for acquiring advanced technological know-how and managerial
expertise. These moves, consequently, caused trade to burgeon. In a striking contrast to virtual
stagnation during the 1960s and severe fluctuation in 1970-76, total trade more than quintupled
between 1978 and 1990 to $115.4 billion. The ratio of trade to GNP rose from 10 per cent in
1978 to 31 per cent in 1990, a level favorably compared with those of other large countries.
Exports averaged 12 per cent annual growth (in real terms) from 1979 through 1990, a rate
matched during the period only by Eastern Asian NICs. China became the world’s 14th largest
exporter in 1990, up from 33rd in 1978 (Wang, 1992). The high rate of export growth boosted
China’s foreign exchange reserve holdings to $40 billion by mid-1991, sixth largest in the world.
By the end of 1990 more than 29,000 investment contracts worth nearly $44 billion had been
signed, $22 billion of which had been transferred China’s foreign borrowing also mounted
steadily, with external debt rising from less than $1 billion in 1978 to $53 billion in 1990.
Indeed China’s integration into the world economy has developed to a degree that most observers
did not believe possible a decade ago (Perkins 1988, Nolan 1990).
One of the hallmarks of China’s opening up the economy has been the spectacular growth
' Unless otherwise specified the data in this paper are based
on Chinese statistics in ZGTJNJ (1991).
3of China-US trade. After a twenty-year hiatus, China-US trade resumed in 1972,* but remained
minimal until 1978. Since then two-way trade grew rapidly from $0.99 billion in 1978 to $11.77
billion in 1990, a more than ten-fold increase. The average annual growth rate of trade registered
about 18 per cent in real terms during this period. China-US trade accounted for 10.2 per cent
of China’s total trade in 1990, whereas it amounted to 4.8 per cent in 1978 (DOTS 1991). The
United States is now China’s third-largest trading partner. China’s exports to the United States
increased steadily from in 1990 to $5.18 billion from $0.27 billion in 1978, except for a slight
contraction in 1983. This upward momentum continued to grow despite the Tiananmen incident.
As a result, the United States absorbed 8.3 per cent of total Chinese exports in 1990. Chinese
purchases from the United States, however, have fluctuated widely, mainly due to changes in
China’s economic policies and the development of bilateral relations. In 1990 the United States
provided 12.4 per cent of the country’s imports. Related to growing trade, United States
investment in China has increased significantly over the past decade. By the end of 1990 the
United States ranked as the second largest investor behind Hong Kong and Macao, accounting
for 10.1 per cent of total foreign direct investment in China. The amount of investment pledged
had totaled $4.4 billion, with paid-in capital of $2.1 billion.
The dramatic advance of China-US trade since 1979 can be attributed to the following
factors. First, China’s subjection to the United States embargo due to the Korean War and its
own ‘self-reliance’ policy had kept the level of trade at a small scale before the late 1970s.
Thus, some of the surge since then can be regarded as taking up of past ‘slack’ and returning to
the normal trade level between the two large countries. Second, the Chinese and American
economies are complementary. American high-technology, capital goods, and industrial materials
arc advanced, competitive and vital to Chinese development, while the United States is China’s
foremost export market. On the other hand, the United States not only demands Chinese textiles,
toys, sporting goods, and food, but also sees China as a vast untapped market for its goods. This
* China-US trade relationship was interrupted by the Korean
hostilities in 1950, when the United States prohibited all exports
to mainland China. After President Nixson's trip to China in
February 1972, the United States terminated the embargo.
Consequently there was no official trade between the two countries
during 1951-71.
4symbiotic relationship has kept bilateral trade booming. Third China established diplomatic
relations with the United States in early 1979. Since then both countries have solved the
claims/assets issue,3 a long outstanding problem which impinged on the full development of
China-US trade. They have also concluded an overall Trade Agreement that year, providing
reciprocal nondiscriminatory treatment for each country’s products. During the 1980s there were
frequent exchanges of visits by high-level government officials and trade issues were often
discussed during these visits. The warming of China-US relations therefore benefited bilateral
trade expansion. Fourth, China initiated an ‘open door’ policy in 1979. A number of policy
instruments have been introduced to both import advanced technology and equipment from the
United States and other developed countries, and to encourage exports. These innovative
measures included the processing of imported components, compensation trade, opening of the
special economic zones and coastal cities, devaluation of the RMB yuan, and decentralization of
the foreign trade management (see Section 5). Moreover, Hong Kong investment in southern
China (especially Guangdong province) increased sharply in the 198Os, involving the movement
of labor-intensive and export-oriented projects from Hong Kong to the mainland As a result,
these areas have been transformed into dynamic export-processing zones. This relocation has
accelerated the growth of China’s exports to the United States (see Section 4).
The acceleration of China-US trade since 1979, although welcome, was unevenly
distributed among various years (see Figure 1). The years 1979-81 witnessed a rapid expansion,
as China benefited from the normalization of diplomatic and commercial relations with the
United States, and from growing United States interest in exporting technology and cheap
agricultural goods to China. Beijing increased its purchases of wheat and cotton from the United
States. It also substantially raised the imports of machinery and transport equipment from the
country. Meanwhile, high oil prices on world markets enticed China to sell more crude oil to
3 On December 17, 1950 the US government froze the Chinese
assets of $80.5 million held in the United States, following the
outbreak of the Korean War. In response China immediately





this issue was critical to the expansion of
the United States since there was some concern
or aircraft could have been seized by American
5the United States. Beijing’s step to decentralize its trade sttucture after 1978 allowed the
establishment of direct contact between Chinese producers and American customers. The
introduction of the ‘exchange rate for internal settlement’ in 1981 also gave Chinese export
enterprises certain incentives to stimulate exports. Consequently, China-US trade rose from $0.99
billion in 1978 to $6.19 billion in 1981.
During the period 1982-83, however, the China-US trade turnover declined, falling 3.8
per cent in 1982 and 27.3 per cent in 1983. Shrinking Chinese imports were primarily
responsible. China’s bumper harvests in those years reduced Chinese reliance on United States
agricultural commodities. Chinese import restrictions, which were imposed to retaliate for United
States limits on Chinese textile exports, caused United States agricultural products and crude
material exports to decrease sharply.’ China’s economic readjustment policies? which
deemphasized heavy industry in favor of light, held down purchases of United States
manufactures. China’s exports to the United States also declined in 1983. Recession and
protectionism in the United States reduced demand for Chinese goods. Lower oil prices hurt
China’s oil exports. In order to implement the readjustment policies, Beijing introduced a trade
licensing system and considerably revised its tariff system in 1982. This prevented local
enterprises from selling abroad those agricultural commodities and raw materials in short
domestic supply.
From 1984 to 1989, China-US trade resumed momentum. The economic recovery in the
United States after 1983, despite being weak, may have contributed to the increase in United
4 At the end of 1982 the China-US textile agreement expired,
after four unsuccessful rounds of negotiations to reach a new
agreement. Under this condition the US government imposed
unilateral controls on 32 textile and apparel categories. In
response China announced that it would stop signing new contracts
for delivery of US grain, cotton and synthetic fiber. As a result
of the textile dispute, China's imports of grain from the U.S. fell
in 1983.
5 The readjustment policies adopted during 1979-82 aimed at
solving the problems of macroeconomic imbalance in China. Under
the readjustment, domestic investment was cut in order to stimulate
consumption, agriculture,
Consequently,
and light industry were given priority.
imports of capital goods and industrial supplies
plummeted.
6States demand for, and reduction in its trade barriers to, China’s exports. During this period,
Chinese authorities accelerated the pace of trade reforms. Beijing sharply devaluated its currency
against the United States dollar in 198586, increased the proportion of foreign exchange earnings
which could be retained by export corporations, granted local authorities greater autonomy over
what they traded, and developed export-processing enterprises along the coast that capitalize on
China’s cheap labor and make use of foreign direct investment. These measures equally led to
a rise in China’s exports to the United States. As the Chinese readjustment policies ended,
domestic investment recovered since late 1983, and this resulted in a resurgence of Chinese
orders for United States capital equipment. United States agricultural sales to China also picked
up since the mid-198Os,  due to the American export subsidy program and poor Chinese harvests
caused by bad weather and a fertilizer shortage. China-US trade thus hit an all-time high in
1989, with a reported value of $12.3 billion.
The rising tide of China-US trade ebbed in 1990, due entirely to the decline in Chinese
imports. This reflected the adverse effects of both extemai and internal elements. Externally,
the United States government imposed economic sanctions on China in the wake of Tiananmen
in June 1989. Exports of high-technology have, therefore, been halted Internally, China adopted
an austerity program to cool the overheated economy in the late 1980s. Since then Beijing has
regained central control over import trade, slashed the number of authorized trade companies,
required a large share of imports to be subject to import licenses, import substitution regulations,
and bans, and tightened controls over foreign exchange allocation for imports. As a result,
Chinese purchases from the U.S. decreased from $7.9 billion in 1989 to $6.6 billion in 1990.
3. The Commodity Composition
Apart from the rising share in China’s total trade and its rapid growth, another
manifestation of the impressive China-US trade since 1979 appears on an examination of its
commodity composition. As the Chinese domestic economy grew during this period, agriculture
diminished in importance relative to GNP while industry’s weight was on the increase. The
structural transformation of the economy, combined with the deliberate ‘open door’ policy, has
resulted in a marked change in the China-US trade mix.
We first examine the degree of concentration of China’s exports to the United States.
7This can be obtained by calculating the Hirschman concentration index (HJ in the following
form:
H, = (3.1)
where Xi is the Chinese export value of commodity grouping i based on the Standard
International Trade Classification (SITC) l-digit classification and X, is the total value of exports
during the same period. The result obtained according to the above disaggregation indicates that
the concentration in&x of China’s exports increased from 0.50 in 1979 to 0.63 in 1987.6 The
rise in concentration is not necessarily undesirable when commodities are grouped under such
a broad classification, but it reflects the growing importance of manufactured products (relative
to primary products) in China’s exports to the United States (see below).
During the 198Os, the commodity composition of China’s exports to the United States
underwent significant changes, from traditional commodities to non-traditional light manufactures
(see Table 1). In 1979 textiles (including yarn, fabrics and clothing) and petroleum products
dominated China’s sales to the United States, together accounting for about 50 per cent of
China’s total exports to the United States. While China-US trade expanded greatly in the first
half of the 198Os, this traditional proportion still held fast. Textiles consistently accounted for
30-40 per cent, with petroleum products supplying another 15-25 per cent of Chinese exports.
Beijing, however, has steadily diversified its export base far beyond its traditional strengths in
recent years. Despite continuing momentum of these sales, the weight of textiles and petroleum
products has tended to decline since the mid-1980s. In 1989, they made up only 28 per cent of
China’s total exports to the United States (Chen 1991). In the meantime, exports of light
manufactures, telecommunications equipment, and consumer electronics have grown extremely
rapidly. Among them, exports of shoes, travel bags, toys, and games have been most impressive,
shooting up from $88 million or 3.9 per cent of total exports in 1983 to $3.1 billion, or 26.1 per
6 The post-1987 decomposed data according to SITC l-digit
classification are not available.
8cent of the total, in 1989 (ChiM Business Review, December 1991, p. 58). These products are
now among China’s top export earners in its trade with the United States.
The increased diversification of China’s exports over the past decade can be attributed to
the following factors. First, this change partly reflects Beijing’s attempt to minimize the costs
caused either by domestic supply shortages or by unfavorable global conditions. The increase
in China’s exports of petroleum products was more rapid than its oil production between 1979
and 1985.’ Thus, the priority to export petroleum products resulted in many domestic enterprises
to operate below capacity due to fuel shortages. The sudden drop in oil prices on world markets
in 1985-86 also caused a sharp reduction in the value of Chinese petroleum exports. China’s
textile exports were hampered by the volume quotas and quantitative restrictions in the United
States. As China-US textile agreements were extended in 1983 and 1987, these restraints have
increased to include all fibers and a wide range of textile products. The number of Chinese
textile exports under United States controls rose from eight categories under the first agreement
(1980-82) to 81 categories under the third agreement (1987-91), with the annual growth rate of
quota limits declining from 4.2 per cent for the former period to 3.3 per cent for the latter. This
has forced the Chinese to increasingly sell other products than they otherwise would on the
United States market. Second, Chinese textile exports contain primarily low-end cotton goods
while exports of petroleum products am primary commodities. In order to pay for the
importation of advanced technology and equipment from the United States and other Western
countries, China has tried to increase export earnings from its manufactures by moving onto high-
value added, labor-intensive products in which China still has competitive advantage. Third,
large numbers of export-oriented processing and assembly plants from Hong Kong, Taiwan and
South Korea have moved onto the Chinese mainland since the mid-1980s. Attracted by its wages
and operational autonomy, Hong Kong manufacturers have produced labor-intensive products in
Guangdong province for the United States market. Moreover, rising wage rates and appreciating
currencies in Taiwan and South Korea coupled with political detente between these regions and
' Oil production in China rose at an average annual rate of
2.6 per cent between 1979 and 1985, much lower than the growth rate
of 15 per cent for the exports of petroleum products during the
same period (calculated from ZGTJNJ 1991).
9China have prompted many Taiwanese and Korean firms to explore China as an export platform
for United States sales. Consequently, China has emerged as a potential source for light
manufactures, such as footwear, travel goods, and toys and games, which United States importers
had previously purchased from those three Asian NICs.
The degree of concentration of China’s imports from the United States post-1979
obtained by calculating the Hirschman concentration index (HJ in the following form:
CZiIlk
H, = i” (2)’ = t
where Mi is the Chinese import value of commodity grouping i based on the SIT.C
(3.2)
l-digit
classification and M, is the total value of imports during the same period. It shows that the
concentration index for China’s imports is lower than its export concentration index, implying
that its import distribution was less concentrated Moreover, the import concentration in&x also
exhibited an upward trend, rising from 0.49 in 1979 to 0.54 in 1987. Table 2 presents a
breakdown of China’s imports from the United States since 1979. From there two distinct
changes can be identified: the declining importance of foodstuffs and crude materials, and the
steady advance in the importance of machinery and equipment.
In the early 1980s China’s imports from the United States consisted mainly of foodstuffs
and crude materials, which accounted for more than 60 per cent of its imports. This share,
however, subsequently receded, falling to about 12 per cent in 1986. While it increased in 1987,
it never recovered, holding 20 per cent of China’s total imports from the United States. The
decline in the relative importance of foodstuffs and crude materials is largely attributable to the
decrease in the United States exports of wheat and cotton to China. In 1980, China’s imports
of wheat and cotton accounted for about 45 per cent of its total imports. Their weight declined
sharply in the first half of the 1980s. By 1987, the sham of wheat imports was only four per
cent, and China had stopped purchasing cotton from the United States.
The decisive factor responsible for the declining trend was the success of China’s rural
reforms in the first half of the 1980s. The agricultural responsibility system, plus favorable
10weather patterns, led to three consecutive years of excellent harvests between 1982-84. Grain
output reached an all-time high of 407 million tons in 1984. China also became self-sufficient
in cotton in 1982 and began to export in commercial quantities in 1983 for the first time.* This
reduced the shortage of agricultural production at home and, consequently, Beijing substantially
cut back on the imports of grain and cotton. The recovery of China’s imports of grain from the
United States after 1987 was due to its failure to meet grain production targets in the last few
years. Natural disasters were no doubt partly to blame, but more serious was the impact of the
latest policies? The measures adopted by the Chinese government in 1985 to replace the state
monopoly purchase and supply system with the contract system lowered farmers’ incentives to
grow grain, leading to an excessive contraction of the area cultivated and, thus, the production
of grain.
The recent years have witnessed a rapid growth of China’s imports of machinery and
transport equipment, and technology from the United States. The shipments of machinery and
transport equipment totaled $230 million in 1979, or 15.5 per cent of Chinese total imports from
the United States, but rose dramatically since then to reach $1.6 billion in 1987, or 46 per cent
of the total. Among them, the leading imports were aircraft and parts, office and automatic data
processing (ADP) machines, power generating equipment, and specialized industrial machinery.
China’s imports of high-technology items from the United States also expanded in the 1980s.
While the number of United States export license approvals increased from 2020 in 1982 to 5724
in 1988, the value of Chinese actual imports rose from $630 million to $1.7 billion (United States
Department of Commerce).
This rapid growth was caused mainly by two reasons. First, China still needs advanced
machinery and technology to fulfd its modernization goals. While the Chinese authorities no
longer consider self-reliance a viable short-term policy, they continue to emphasize effective ways
8 By 1985-6 China had emerged as the world's second largest
cotton exporter.
' The other factors responsible for the decline in China's
grain output were the decrease in agricultural
deteriorating irrigation and drainage capacities,
investment,
and farmers'
growing enthusiasm for working in rural industries because of
higher incomes.
11to substitute more domestic products for imports over time. Thus, the country’s import priority
will focus on more capital goods and technology. In this respect, China pays high regard for
United States products. Second, prompted by United States interest in improving relations with
China and mounting pressures from American exporters, the United States government eased its
export control policy towards China in 1983. Since then it has gradually allowed more products
with higher technical levels to be exported to China, and simplified export control procedures.1o
This has provided China with greater access to United States technology and equipment.
4. Hong Kong’s Role in China-US Trade
A striking feature of China-US trade is the prominent role played by Hong Kong. This
role is reflected in many aspects. First, China incutred a substantial trade surplus with Hong
Kong, totaling more than $50 billion during the period 1979-89 (calculated from DOTS). This
favorable trade balance provided Beijing with sufficient foreign exchange earnings to finance its
trade deficits with developed countries (including the United States, if we assume that Chinese
statistics are correct), from which China imported advanced technology and equipment to carry
out its modernization program. Moreover, a large number of labor-intensive light manufacturing
projects for the United States market moved their operations from Hong Kong to southern China
in the 1980s. With this movement, lots of foreign capital, production know-how, and
management expertise were also brought in. This has improved the marketability of Chinese
products in the United States.”
In addition, Hong Kong is an important entrepot for China-US trade. Although entrepot
trade via Hong Kong existed between the two countries pre-1979, it became more notable in the
1980s. Increasing quantities of products from China and the United States are reexported to each
other through Hong Kong. This development has had a significant impact upon China-US
lo Prior to June 1989, the United States was close to
implementation of a distribution license procedure for China, which
would allow multiple shipments under a single license. The move
has been suspended due to the Tiananmen incident.
I1 According to Chen (19911, in the last few years US imports
of Chinese light manufactures, especially footwear, toys, and
consumer electronics, have grown sharply while US imports from Hong
Kong of these products have declined.
12bilateral trade. For example, one of the disputes between both sides refers to discrepancies of
their respective data on trade balance. Beijing says it had a trade deficit of $1.4 billion with the
I U.S. in 1990, while Washington insists that China ran up a $10.4 billion surplus. The difference
largely results from the reexports of substantial Chinese goods to the U.S. through Hong Kong,
which Washington, unlike Beijing, counts as Chinese. It is, therefore, important to analyze Hong
Kong’s role as an entrepot when one examines the growth and structural change in China-US
trade.
To begin with, a definitional note is in order. According to Sung (1990), enttepot trade
is indirect; imports for reexports are consigned to a buyer in the entrepot and the buyer takes
legal possession of the products after clearing customs. These imports may then be processed
before being reexported. Processing may include packaging, sorting, grading, bottling, drying,
assembling, decorating, or even minor manufacturing processes. Any processing that permanently
changes the shape, nature, form, or utility of the basic materials used in manufacture makes the
product a domestic export, not a reexport The drawback of the definition, however, is that it
.._ does not quantify the amount of added value necessary to change a product’s country of origin.
China’s reexports to the United States through Hong Kong have expanded rapidly since
1979. According to Hong Kong statistics, Hong Kong’s reexports of Chinese-origin products to
the U.S. increased from $340 million in 1980 to nearly $10.5 billion in 1990, a thirty-fold rise
(see Table 3). This represents an annual average real growth rate of 37 per cent. In 1980, the
United States absorbed about 20 per cent of China’s total reexports through Hong Kong; it
became the largest market for China’s reexports in 1990, accounting for 34 per cent of the total.
Since 1987, the value of Chinese reexports to the United States has even surpassed its direct
exports to the country. The commodity composition of China’s reexports through Hong Kong
to the United States underwent significant changes during the period under study. In 1980,
textile yarn and clothing were major reexport products, accounting for 43.5 per cent of China’s
total reexports to the United States. While they continued to grow, their share tended to decline.
In 1990, clothing held only 18 per cent of the total. Taking their place as major reexports were
toys and games, footwear, and telecommunications equipment. .In 1990, these three categories
accounted for 50.8 per cent of China’s total reexports to the United States, whereas the sham was
31 per cent in 1984.
13The same kind of dramatic growth can also be seen in United States reexports to China
through Hong Kong (see Table 4). The value of United States reexports to China went from $68
million in 1980 to $1.3 billion in 1990, nearly a twenty-fold increase. Consequently, the share
of the United States reexports to China in its total reexports through the territory rose from 10.7
per cent to 42 per cent during the same period. In contrast to China’s reexports, United States
reexports were more diversified and the commodity composition did not change considerably
over the past decade: office machines and ADP equipment averaged about 15 per cent, with
tobacco products accounting for another 10-15 per cent of the United States reexports to China.
The remainder was made up of a wide miscellany of manufactured products including textile
yarn, artificial resins, and electrical machinery and apparatus.
How do we explain Hong Kong’s increasing role as middleman in China-US trade?
Economic theory suggests that a middleman creates opportunity for trade because it is able to
lower both transaction costs and transportation costs. An exchange structure in which numerous
individuals trade with each other is generally inefficient because it increases the number of
bilateral trade links and thus transaction costs. Under this circumstance, intermediation is
desirable since establishing a bilateral trade links between economic agents usually involves a
fixed transaction cost (Townsend 1978). Similarly, product heterogeneity increases customers’
search costs in a marketplace with many sellers and therefore demand for intermediation (Stuart
1979). The long distance between suppliers and consumers also raises the attractiveness of
intermediation, which emerges to economize on transportation costs. Moreover, a middleman
that serves a large number of producers or customers can have economies of scale. When many
traders agglomerate in a city, it tends to be easier to acquire necessary information and to arrange
bilateral contracts, thus making the city even more efficient in trade (Sung 1990).
The demand for intermediation in China-US trade increased in the 1980s. Since 1979,
China has decentralized its foreign trade system by replacing vertical channels of command with
horizontal links. While twelve state-owned foreign trade corporations (FfCs) monopolized
China’s foreign trade during the pm-1979 period, the number of trading companies had increased
to more than 1000 by the mid-1980s. This made it prohibitively costly for an individual
American fum to establish trade links with all Chinese trading companies. Similarly, due to a
lack of experience in foreign trade and the regulations restricting foreign traveling, Chinese
14enterprises had difficulties in finding directly appropriate United States suppliers/customers and
in negotiating (with them) prices and terms of delivery. Moreover, as examined in Section 3,
during the 1980s manufactured products gained dominance while the share of primary goods
decreased in China-US trade. Manufactures are usually more heterogeneous than primary goods,
thus increasing search costs. Specifically, China’s reexports of textile and clothing to the U.S.
through Hong Kong reflected its attempt to make use of the territory’s redundant quotas to
expand the export of these restricted items.
There was a tendency that Hong Kong became increasingly integrated with the economy
of south China over the past decade. During 1979-89, some 70 per cent of direct foreign
investment in China came from Hong Kong, and almost 22,000 enterprises with realized capital
of $15.4 billion were approved by the Chinese authorities. While being relatively small and
medium-scale operations in Guangdong province, these investments mainly involved export
processing activities. After product manufacturing, some were shipped back to Hong Kong for
the high value-added processing or services, such as packaging and marketing.‘* Thus, they
constitute an important source of Hong Kong’s reexports to the United States.
Hong Kong has many advantages of being a middleman in China-US trade. Located at
the hub of dynamic Pacific Kim economies, close to the Chinese market, and blessed with a
spectacular harbor, Hong Kong has all the natural tools needed to become an entrepot without
other natural resources. The light hand of British administration has also enabled Hong Kong
to enjoy free port status and a favorable business climate which rewards incentive, and nurtures
local traders so that they have had a wide range of contacts with the enterprises and government
officials in both China and the United States. Moreover, China and the United States have a very
signXcant presence in Hong Kong. More than 900 United States companies, including major
consumer goods manufactures and wholesalers, have offices in Hong Kong. Meanwhile, a large





and human skills in
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Hong Kong established numerous textile and
Guangdong province. Many products made by
then sent back to Hong Kong, where they were
utilizing the relatively advanced technology
Hong Kong's textile industry, before being
15province and municipality in China (except Xinjiang and Tibet) has direct representation in Hong
Kong. These have led to the dependency of the two countries on Hong Kong as entrepot for
their bilateral trade.
5. China’s Trade Policy
Since 1979, the Chinese government has clearly recognized the importance of foreign
trade as a means to foster economic growth, even for a country as vast as China. The trade
policy sails have been trimmed to encourage trade expansion, aimed at moving the country
towards a high level of participation in the world economy. Of these measures, the most
prominent are the currency devaluation and the decentralization of foreign trade management.
Although the effect of each of these measures on China-US trade growth cannot be singled out,
they are taken up separately below only for analytical convenience.
5.1 Currency devaluation
Possibly the single most important policy instrument affecting trade is exchange rate
policy. Prior to 1978, however, the Chinese exchange rate had an unfavorable effect on its trade
growth. First, the Chinese currency RMB yuan was substantially overvalued, although it is
difficult to determine to exactly what degree vis-a-vis United States dollar.13 This was reflected
by the fact that in China’s trade with the Western countries, when the foreign prices of traded
goods were converted into the yuan at the offkial exchange rate, there generally existed losses
in China’s exports and profits in its imports. Second, during most of the pre-1979 period the
official exchange rate was basically pegged at a given level, with very few adjustments.
Subsequently, price changes either at home or abroad could exert little influence on the pegged
rate. Moreover, real trade flows in China were centrally determined and were independent of the
domestic price level. Thus, the exchange rate at best played an accounting role in Chinese trade.
l3 Mah (1972) estimated that the yuan was overvalued by more
than 50 per cent by comparing the yuan and dollar prices of China's
output of 186 commodities in 1951, weighted by Sino-West trade for
each commodity. However, due to the inadequacy of available data,
possible bias resulting from selection of sample and weight, and
the irrationality of China's prices, his estimate can serve only as
a first approximation.
16The official administered exchange rate has been adjusted periodically since the early
1980s. During 1981-84, a dual exchange rate system was introduced. Under this system, the
official exchange rate of 1.5 yuan per United States dollar was used for non-trade transactions
while trade enterprises were allowed to convert their foreign exchange earnings into the yuan at
an internal settlement rate (that is, 2.8 yuan per United States dollar). Over time, however, the
gap between the two rates narrowed as adjustments were made to the offkial rate, and the
internal settlement rate was abolished at the end of 1984. During 1985, gradual depreciations
were witnessed: from January to October that year, there were depreciations almost every month,
reducing the yuan from 2.8 per United States dollar to 3.2 per dollar and averaging 1.4 per cent
in nominal terms. The yuan was devalued again by 14 per cent in July 1986. After the
Tiananmen incident, Beijing sharply devalued its currency by 21 per cent against the United
States dollar in December 1989, and a second devaluation of nearly 10 per cent followed in
November 1990. Since then the official exchange rate has continued to depreciate to the current
rate of 5.4 yuan per United States dollar (see Figure 2).
The Chinese experience of repeated and large devaluations since 1979 has some
theoretical foundation. Economic theory suggests that devaluation is likely to promote trade
expansion under the quantitative restrictions (QR) regime. First, to the extent that the devaluation
absorbs premiums on import licenses, the domestic price of import-competing commodities will
not increase. The increased price of foreign exchange will, therefore, be more fully reflected in
the domestic price of exportables than in the domestic price of import-competing goods. Second,
devaluations are usually accompanied by the removal of surcharges on imports and of subsidies
on nontraditional exports. Because the preexisting export subsidies are usually smaller than the
surcharge on imports, the effect is to make the net devaluation proportionately larger for exports
than for import-competing commodities (Krueger 1978).
Practically, China’s devaluation policy was based on at least three reasons. First, Beijing
saw currency devaluation as a means of reducing its need to subsidize exports of manufactured
goods. The domestic production costs of many Chinese manufactured products were greater than
prevailing international prices when converted to domestic currency at the official exchange rate.
Thus, the government’s subsidies paid to the state trade corporations that lose money on these
exports grew sharply. The currency  adjustments had the effect of narrowing the gap between the
17domestic production costs and international prices. Second, with the revival of the modernization
drive, China needed to import heavy volumes of large-scale plant and equipment from the West.
Given a limited amount of foreign loans due to ideological constraints, devaluation is used to
stimulate exports in order to pay for mounting imports. Third, it was well-known that Taiwan
and South Korea had successfully adopted the devaluation policy, among other measures, to
promote trade and economic growth. The Chinese government was impressed with their
experience and actively copied their method in the interest of development.
One crucial question concerning devaluation relates to the behavior of the real exchange
rate (RER), which is defined as the domestic relative price of traded goods to nontraded goods.
It has been argued that maintaining the real exchange rate at the ‘wrong’ level generates incorrect
signals and severely hampers the degree of competitiveness of the tradables sectors (Edwards
1989). Generally, an increase in the real exchange rate makes the price of the tradables more
expensive relative to the price of the nontrables. Thus, there will be substitution in production
towards tradables and substitution in expenditure away from tradables. This, ceteris puribus,
would generate an improvement in the balance of trade adjustment. Likewise a deterioration in
the balance of trade adjustment may happen if the real exchange rate decreases. The real
exchange rate here is measured lin the following form:
RER= z’ (5.1)
where E is China’s official nominal exchange rate defined as units of RMB yuan per United
States dollar, WH’ is the United States wholesale price index, and CPI is China’s domestic
consumer price index. The results indicate that the repeated devaluations in China have increased
its real exchange rate from 1.49 yuan per United States dollar in 1979 to 3.32 yuan per dollar
in 1990 (that is, real depreciations) (see Figure 2).
To test the hypothesis that exports depend on the real exchange rate, we estimate a
multiple regression model expressed in the following equation:
(5.2)
18where X, refers to the real value of China’s exports to the United States, RER, is China’s real
exchange rate (expressed in units of RMB yuan per United States dollar), I is a time trend, and p t
denotes a random disturbance term, which it is assumed to be uncorrelated,  with zero mean and
constant variance. A basic assumption underlying the model is that the supply of China’s exports
is perfectly elastic. That is, despite increased Chinese exports to the U.S., export prices of these
goods remain fixed and exporters pass through to importers the full amount of the real exchange
depreciation. This assumption seems reasonable because China’s share of United States imports
is small. Equation (5.2) is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) using the data during the
period 197990. The results are presented in equation (5.3).”
lnx, = -0.40 + 0.4olnRER,  + 0.12t
(-4.32) (3.59) (14.21) (5.3)
Rz = 0.98 F-statistic = 216.25
DW = 2.36
The regression equation fits well because the F-statistic is significant at the five per cent level.
The estimate of the coefficient of RRR variable PI is positive and statistically significant at the
five per cent level. This indicates that the real devaluations of the yuan during this period have
accelerated the growth of China’s exports to the United States.
When one evaluates China’s experience of currency devaluation in the post-1979 period,
several points should be noted. First, a nominal devaluation cannot promote export expansion,
unless the nominal exchange rate depreciates at a rate greater than the rise in the price of the
nontradables so that the real exchange rate increases. Over the past decade, China repeatedly
devaluated the yuan to reduce the erosion of domestic inflation. This reinforced the
competitiveness of China’s exports on world markets. However, the overheated economy and,
consequently, severe inflation in the late 1980s resulted in an excess demand for nontradables
and a rise in production costs for ttadables in China. Under this circumstance, many Chinese
manufacturers preferred to produce for the domestic market rather than for overseas. Second,
a change in the real exchange rate is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for trade growth
I4 In this section, the figures in parentheses under the
equations are t-ratios unless otherwise specified.
19in the short-term because it depends, among other factors, on the supply elasticity of the trade
goods sector. Strong government intervention in China has enabled the transfer of substantial
resources into the export sector after the real exchange rate depreciations. This, in conjunction
with Chinese policy to allow exporters to retain a certain proportion of their foreign exchange
earnings (see next subsection), seems to have stimulated China’s supply of exportables. Third,
it is improbable that the exchange rate will play a significant role in a traditional centrally-
planned economy since state-run trade enterprises are not completely responsible for their profits
and losses. Even during the 198Os, the Chinese government still controlled the majority of traded
commodities. This means that Chinese trade enterprises will have reduced interests in responding
to devaluation unless they can fully enjoy the benefits from it.
5.2 Decentralization of foreign trade management
Prior to 1978, foreign trade was a state monopoly in China. The supreme agency for
supervision and planning of foreign trade was the Ministry of Foreign Trade  (MOFT), and twelve
foreign trade corporations (FTCs) were formed under the MOFT, each specializing in a particular
range of traded goods or dealing with some supplementary aspect of trade. As exclusive agents,
these FTCs and their local branches handled the actual import and export business in China.
Neither other individuals nor other firms were allowed to trade directly with foreign countries.
Foreign trade was conducted in accordance with state mandatory plans as a means of keeping
balance in the Chinese economy. Exports were purchased by the FTCs and imports were carried
out in the form of an allocation system. The FT’Cs had to surrender all the foreign exchange
earned from export to the central bank, and the government was responsible for their losses.
Although the state monopoly of foreign trade enabled the Chinese authorities to amass
scarce foreign currency to acquire necessary capital goods and raw materials, it impeded China’s
trade growth. First, under this system the tradable goods sector of the domestic economy was
effectively insulated from the rest of the world Consequently, imports were not well suited to
Chinese needs, and Chinese exporters could not easily learn how to adapt their products for
foreign consumption. Moreover, trade negotiations through the FTCs tended to be prolonged so
that neither exporters nor importers could react quickly and efficiently to changes in the world
market. Second, since the central government assumed sole responsibility for their profits and
20losses, both trading and producing enterprises had no incentive to increase trade and reduce costs,
and restricted themselves to passively fulfilling the trade plans made by the higher authorities.
In the late 197Os, the leadership decided that unless China’s foreign trade management
is decentralized its foreign trade could not be expanded and the efficiency of the tradable goods
sector could not be improved. In addition, some Eastern European countries (such as Hungary)
had carried out reforms of their foreign trade structures, and suitable corporations had been given
the right to deal directly with foreign countries. This was regarded by Chinese policymakers as
a useful model to follow. Moreover, because they possessed significant experience and resource
in conducting foreign trade, many localities (for example Guangdong and Shanghai) began to
display both greater eagerness and ingenuity in doing their own business with foreign firms.
Pressure from them was another factor behind Beijing’s move.
Beijing attempted three times to decentralize its foreign trade management between 1978-
90. The first wave of decentralization lasted from 1978 to mid-1981. During this period, the
government permitted individual provinces, municipalities, and industrial ministries to set up their
own trade companies. Bypassing the FTCs, these companies had the authority to export or
import the products under their respective jurisdiction. They were also allowed to retain up to
30 per cent of the foreign exchange earnings for their own use, rather than remit them fully to
the state as was previously required Moreover, Beijing opened four special economic zones
(SEZs) in southern China, where preferential tax and tariff rates and tax holidays were offered
to attract direct foreign investment and promote exports. From mid-1981, however, the
government tightened central management of foreign trade to solve the problem of the trade
deficit. Consequently, the FTCs regained authority over many commodities which had previously
slipped into the hands of localities or ministries.
The second round of decentralization began in September 1984, when the government
launched a comprehensive reform of trade structure. The reform mainly included: (i) the
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT)  lost direct managerial authority
over the state FTCs, and was only in charge of trade policy-making and world market research.
Actual activity in foreign trade was car&d out by a variety of specialized trading companies; (ii)
the number of products subject to mandatory plans was significantly reduced; (iii) an agency
system was introduced to replace the old purchase system of acquiring goods for export. Under
21the agency system, the trading corporations served for the producing enterprises in the marketing
of their products abroad. While they were charged for this service, the producing enterprises,
and not the trading corporations, were to bear any losses incurred in the process. Moreover,
Beijing opened 14 coastal cities and Hainan Island to foreign investment and permitted local
authorities to sign trade contracts with foreign firms. While it stimulated trade growth, China
suffered an unprecedented trade deficit and decreasing foreign exchange reserves in 1985. As
a result, Beijing reasserted control over the trade sector by reestablishing mandatory quotas for
exports, closing down more than a thousand local trading companies, and imposing taxes, tariffs
and licenses against imports.
The third wave of decentralization occured during 1987-88. Beijing granted local
branches of central trade corporations greater autonomy over what they traded, replacing volume
quotas with contractual targets for earnings and profits. Beijing also billed factories directly for
their imports and permitted several hundred export-producing factories to sign sales contracts
directly with foreign customers. Moreover, the shares of foreign exchange earnings retained by
domestic enterprises in several industries and some regions were raised, with shares for
enterprises affected positively with the degree of processing of the commodities exported and
reaching as high as 100 per cent.” This wave was reversed in late 1988 as the government
started the austerity program to cool the heated economy, and invoked administrative measures
to re-centralize trading authorities. Since then, the number of authorized foreign trade
corporations has been slashed, and a larger share of imports and exports has been subject to
licenses, quotas, and bans.
Despite being, at times, interrupted by attempts at recentralization, the efforts towards the
decentralization of foreign trade management have been considerably creditable. There are now
a large number of provincial and municipal trading corporations responsible for serving the
enterprises in their localities, as well as ministerial trading firms authorized to export the products
l5 By 1988, the Chinese government
industrial goods, arts and crafts, and
of the foreign exchange earned from
permitted exporters of light
garments to keep 70 per cent
exports,
building and electronics industries to retain
SEZs and Hainan Island were granted the right
cent.
and the machine-
50 per cent. The
to retain 100 per
22made by their industries. In contrast to the late 197Os, when several state FTCs monopolized
foreign trade, the non-FTCs  exported products worth $10.4 billion in 1990, accounting for nearly
one-fifth of China’s total export value (see Table 5).16 Looking at the proportion of export
increment during the period 198190, the progress of decentralization appears mote impressive
since the value by non-FTCs amounted to 25 per cent of China’s total.
It is hypothesized that decentralization of foreign trade management, an institutional
change, would give domestic enterprises incentives and freedom to promote foreign trade. In
or&r to test the hypothesis, we.estimate the equation (5.4).
hT, = a0 + alDt_l+ a,t + pt (5.4)
D = 1, in 1979-81, 1984-5, and 1987-8
0, in 1982-3, 1986, and 1989-90
where T, refers to China’s total trade value with the United States, and t is a time trend D,_, is
a dummy variable, which is set equal to one for the time period when the trade management was
decentralized and zero otherwise. D,_, is lagged for one period, which can be justified by the fact
that it usually takes time for trading enterprises to respond to the institutional changes. Data are
for the period 197990. By using OLS method, we report the results in equation (5.5).
lnT, = 1.27 + 0.22 D,_, + 0.08t
(12.71) (3.17) (8.27) (5.5)
R2 = 0.90 F-statistic = 20.34
DW = 2.05
The dummy variable coefficient in equation (5.5) is positive and statistically significant at the
five per cent level. This indicates that decentralization of foreign trade management seems to
have increased China’s trade with the United States. To examine the effects of institutional
changes on China’s exports and imports respectively, we estimate the equations (5.6) - (5.7) as
follows.
l6 The data are obtained by subtracting the export value for
each year in Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and
Trade from that in ZGTJNJ, since the former refers to the exports
conducted by the FTCs only whereas the latter originates from the
records of the Chinese customs department.
231q = -0.33 + 0.33 InREIR, + 0.040,_, + 0.12t
(-2.04) (2.24) (0.76) (19.70) (5.6)
Rz = 0.99 F-statistic = 98.40
DW = 2.23
In&f, = 0.90 + 0.350,_, + 0.06t
(7.48) (3.93) (5.46) (5.7)
I? = 0.81 F-statistic = 10.19
DW = 1.99
The estimate of the dummy variable in equation (5.7) is statistically significant at the five per
cent level, while that in equation (5.6) is not significantly different from zero even at the ten per
cent level. This denotes that, given these data and the methodology used, the decentralization
of foreign trade management in China has only produced significant impact upon its imports from
the United States.
The advent of decentralization, however, was far from an unalloyed blessing. Several
problems have been identified from the past experience. Fit, in the wake of decentralization
China’s exports increased steadily while its imports took an unexpected jump. Consequently,
trade deficits ballooned and foreign exchange reserves dropped precipitously. On each occasion,
when the trade deficit grew at an alarming rate, Beijing stepped in to regain some of trade
authority it had relinquished. This results mainly from the irrational price structute in China.
At the current exchange rate, the domestic prices of manufactures appear to be higher than world
prices. Once the central oversight of trade was relaxed, Chinese enterprises preferred to import
from abroad rather than to sell their products on the competitive international market. Second,
decentralization worsened quality-control problems for many relatively fungible goods such as
foodstuffs, minerals, cashmere, and fireworks, as it put trade of these products in the hands of
Chinese agencies (also associated with Hong Kong middlemen) with neither experience nor
scruples.” Third, decentralization without effective regulations led to a marked decline in
" For example, several injuries causedby sub-standard Chinese
fireworks have led to product confiscations by the US Consumer
Product Safety Commission and hikes in insurance premiums for US
importers (China Business Review, January 1990).
24reliability of delivery. Since Chinese enterprises could retain a certain proportion of foreign
exchange earnings from export, it became common that they broke contracts with foreign
customers and Chinese sales agencies if another buyer offered a better price.
6. Conclusion
The salient points to emerge from the analysis of the growth and structural change in
China-US trade post-1979 can be summarized as follows.
First, the slow growth of world trade has not constituted a binding constraint on China-US
trade development. Global recession in the early 1980s was followed by the weak recovery. In
addition, protectionism against the commodities in which China has a comparative advantage
increased sharply. Although such an unfavorable international environment might reduce the
import demand for the products of the two countries, China-US trade continued to grow. This
results partly from the complementary nature of the two economies. While Beijing sees the
United States as the most important source of advanced technology and equipment, Washington
regards China as a vastly untapped market for its exports. In part, this growth was achieved
through the competition effect, By price competition and quality upgrading, each of the two
countries has steadily eaten into the market of the other.‘* Therefore, it is believed that
flexibility and ability to compete will maintain the momentum of China-US trade.
Second, the governments of the two countries played a positive role in promoting China-
US trade growth. Since 1979, much progress has been made in developing a framework for
normal commercial relations between China and the United States. This framework was largely
built through government-to-government agreements and consultations. Of course, the role
required of governments is different in different countries and at various times. During the post-
1979 period, China did decentralize its trade system, but various types of state intervention were
also pursued for promoting trade: the real exchange rate rose rapidly as a result of repeated
devaluations, and the government’s policy to allow localities and enterprises to trade with foreign
countries paid off handsomely. In addition, Beijing provided information on world markets and
'* This is exemplified by the fact that China's share of the
US imports from all LDCs rose from 0.7 per cent in 1979 to 7.7 per
cent in 1990 while the US share of China's imports from all DCs
increased from 16.8 per cent in 1979 to 25.3 per cent in 1990.
25organized purchases and sales of products. China’s trade with the United States can grow
dramatically only when trade policies are favorable.
Third, despite an expansion of its exports to the United States, China does not seem to
follow an export-led strategy. In recent years, there has been rising concern in the United States
that China’s continued export expansion would disrupt their domestic enterprises and markets.
This anxiety, which has prompted protectionist sentiment, may be somewhat excessive since
China accounted for only one per cent of United States imports in 1990. In contrast to small
economies, exports cannot represent a decisive factor to sustain the momentum of development
for China. Chinese economic growth in the 1980s was mainly fueled by domestic forces.
China’s ratio of export to GNP was about 17 per cent in 1990, remaining far below those of East
Asian neighbors who actually do engage in export-led growth.‘9  It is estimated that the total
employment generated by industrial exports in the late 1980s accounted for less than one-quarter
of China’s total industrial employment (Wang 1992). Therefore, while China should make its
administrative and market practices more transparent and simple for the United States imports,
the United States should resist the forces of protectionism.
Fourth, China-US trade cannot be further expanded without the reciprocal granting of
most-favored-nation status. Over the past decade MFN status was the cornerstone of China-US
trade growth. This year, however, has seen an intense debate in the United States regarding the
extension of China’s MFN status. Stripping China of its MFN status would severely damage the
bilateral trade relationship. Should it happen, China’s exports to the United States would be
reduced due to a sharp rise in tariffs. The loss of foreign exchange, resulting from depressed
sales to the United States, would complete the vicious circle by making it difficult for China to
afford imports from the United States. United States consumers would also suffer because they
had to pay higher prices for Chinese goods. Since MFN is a reciprocal relationship, United
States exports to China would fall if Beijing retaliates and increases its tariffs. Among those hit
hardest would be aircraft, agricultural pesticides and fertilizers, and grain. This would have a
negative impact upon the United States domestic economy, which is currently afflicted with a
I9 For example, the ratios of export to GNP in 1990 were 27 per
cent in South Korea, 73 per cent in Malaysia, and 29 per cent in
Thailand (calculated from IMF: International Financial Statistics).
26contained depression (Jay Levy and David Levy, 1992). Removal of MFN would be a ‘body
blow’ to Hong Kong, depriving it of the benefit of handling enoxmous  shipments of goods from
China annually, and turning much of its investments (and United States investments) in southern
China sour. Moreover, revocation of MFN could backfke on the United States and create ripples
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Souroe:  My oalculatlon by using data In ZQTJNJ and IMF:1.Table 1. Commodity .composition of China's exports to the U.S.
(1979 - 87)
(percentage of total)
1i 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Foodstuffs 8.9 5.6 5.2 5.5 5.2 4.9 4.2 4.2 4.4
Crude materials 27.9 25.0 33.1 31.5 23.6 24.6 28.9 15.7 10.0
of which, petroleum 16.1 12.8 15.5 26.2 19.1 20.7 25.6 13.4 7.6
& products
Chemicals 10.1 10.2 6.6 6.0 5.8 5.2 4.2 3.7 3.2
Semi-manufactured goods 15.4 22.3 19.8 16.9 17.4 18.9 15.7 14.7 14.6
of which, textile 8.6 8.9 9.3 7.7 7.9 9.4 7.0 7.9 6.6
fabrics
Machinery C equipment 0.2 0.5 2.1 2.1 1.8 2.2 2.3 2.9 6.9
Other manufactured goods 36.8 36.1 32.8 37.8 45.8 43.6 43.6 56.9 59.7
of which, clothing 25.4 23.6 22.3 27.8 34.5 29.4 25.1 35.8 31.6
footwear, toys & games 2.6 2.4 2.7 3.0 3.9 6.2 11.7 13.4 18.3
Others 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 1.1 1.8 1.1
Sources: 1979: Hsu (19891, p. 97.
1980-7: USCIA: China: International Trade Quarterly Review.Table 3. China's re-exports of major commodities to the U.S. via Hong Kong
(1979 - 90)
(in million U.S. $)
11 1979 11980 1981 1982 I1983 I1984 I1985 1986 I1987 I1988 I1989 1 1990
Total 11 147 1 340 503 589 758 1123 1445 2392 3558 5540 8461 10482
232 305 382 492 980 984 1087 1632 1930 Clothing 46 115 148
44 31 ) 40 1 52 1 49 Textile yarn 6
fabrics
14 33 A I
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
627 1070 1646 2491 3081
62 139 319 632 1161
205 324 464 n.a. n.a.
82
n.a.
16 27 I 49 I 98 1 155
Telecommunications
equipment
n.a. n.a. 1 n.a. I 34 I 27 ~62 1 2399) 496 1 992 I-1077
Electrical
machinery
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 20 53 152 460 688 826
I





















(in million of U.S. $
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
101 170 203 375 575 567 792 1228 1316 1320
11 12 21 33 48 65 91 167 213 147
6 13 21 74 90 109 190 170 149 136
11 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 28 62 94
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 12 26 74 256 141 139
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 29 34 69 78 n.a.
Source: Hong Kong Review of Overseas Trade (1981-901, Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong.
-.Table 5. Channels of China's exports, 1978 - 90








value share(%) value share(%)
1978 9.75 --- --- 9.75 100.0
1981 22.01 1.12 5.1 20.89 94.9
1982 1 22.32 0.50 2.2 1 21.82 97.8
I I
1983 22.23 0.03 0.1 22.20 99.9
1984 26.14 1.72 6.6 24.42 93.4
1985 27.35 1.44 5.3 25.91 94.7
1986 30.94 3.93 12.7 27.01 87.3
1987 39.44 4.84 12.3 34.60 87.7
1988 47.54 7.44 15.7 40.10 84.3
1989 52.54 9.10 17.3 43.44 82.7
1990 62.06 10.36 16.7 51.70 83.3
Note: The data for the period 1979-80 are not available.
Sources: ZGTJWJ and Almanac of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, Bejing.Bibliography
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